Everything You Need to Know about Belichick's Draft Day Trades

Everyone knows it: Bill Belichick loves to trade down. Life, death and Belichick trading down. Other things people know include that he is as good at drafting wide receivers as Tom Brady is at dancing, he is good for one “wild card” pick per draft and his drafts have been noticeably worse since Scott Pioli, the former vice president of player personnel, departed.

I will be addressing each of those Theories of Belichickian Drafting in detail.

Up first: Belichick loves to trade down.

The first round of the 2013 NFL Draft took place on April 25^th with the Patriots sitting at the 29^th overall pick, but with only four picks throughout the following six rounds. That would be the fewest selections for the Patriots in their existence (the draft was shortened to seven rounds in 1994 and was as long as 17 rounds in ’76). Since joining the Patriots in 2000, Belichick has averaged almost nine selections per draft. Everyone knew he was trading down. Nevertheless, the inevitable decision to vacate the 29^th pick caused reactions like this one by ESPN’s Bill Simmons:

I wish Tom Brady was on Twitter so he could tweet, "I'm gonna be 36 this season, why the F do we keep trading backwards????"
— Bill Simmons (@BillSimmons) April 26, 2013

A logical argument, considering only two receivers, Tavon Austin and DeAndre Hopkins, had been taken at that point in the draft. The Vikings jumped in and took a wide receiver of their own, Cordarrelle Patterson.

But the argument falls apart upon closer inspection. Belichick is shrewd and has always shown an ability to look ahead while remaining very competitive, one-play-from-another-ring competitive. True, Tom Brady does not have that many years left. But is he retiring after next season? No. This was not a trade for a future pick – it was a trade for four, four picks in the very same draft. These draftees will be spending a few years with Brady at the helm.

This draft was also touted for its depth and disparaged for its lack of star power. The gap between #29 and #52 (the earliest pick the Vikings gave up) is not as significant as it usually would be.

There is all of that without mentioning that everyone was trying to trade down in this draft, yet Belichick still managed to swipe four picks from Rick Spielman, Minnesota’s general manager. According to the draft pick value chart, the Patriots gained 9.5 points with this trade – not an overwhelming amount, but still impressive considering the deflated market. Compare that to Oakland losing 520 value points when they traded down from #3 to #12, the Bills nabbing just 8.6 from 21 spots higher and the Cowboys giving up 80 points. The four other teams that traded down in the first round averaged a net loss of 151.65 if the 7^th rounder the Rams gave to the 49ers ends up as the 193^rd pick. Come next year, the average will probably be closer to -155.35 (the 7^th rounder was originally the Patriots’).

What Belichick did, getting more value than any other first round team that traded down and from the lowest spot, was nothing short of highway robbery. As Bill Barnwell of Grantland.com wrote, “Bill Belichick is smart, but sometimes he succeeds just by aiding other teams’ efforts to be stupid.”

Patriots fans, Simmons included, should be commending the value that Belichick somehow scraped up. This was, in truth, one of his shrewdest moves.

As for those of you who are getting tired of constantly trading down, would you be surprised if I told you that of Belichick’s 49 draft-day pick-for-pick trades since 2000, he has only traded down two more times than up? He has moved up 16 times, down 18 and traded for future picks 15 times. Now, those future trades are typically, and illogically, grouped in with the trading down. The truth is that only once has a future trade not resulted in the Patriots gaining a higher draft pick than the one they gave up. (In a 2003 trade with the Ravens, the Pats gave up #19 for #41 for next season’s #21, but it worked out pretty well. More on that later.) And all 15 of the trades for future picks resulted in a significant net gain in value.

I hear you, guy screaming for context. It’s coming.

When splitting the trades into the rounds in which they took place, you still find the gap between trading up and trading down is not as great as some like to think. Of Belichick’s 13 first-round trades, he moved up four times, down six and for a future pick three times. Of the three future trades, Belichick essentially moved higher in the draft twice and down once, which brings the totals to six trades up and seven down.

Round	# of Trades	Up	Down	Future	Value	Value/Trade
1	13	4	6	3	+1,461.4	+112.415
2	12	5	7	0	-63.4	-5.283
3	9	1	1	7	+1,782.4	+198.044
4	3	3	0	0	-25.1	-8.367
5	7	2	3	2	+31.5	+4.5
6	3	1	0	2	+26.6	+8.867
7	2	0	0	2	+11.2	+5.1

Throughout his Patriots tenure, Belichick has amassed a net gain of 3,881.7 value points through these 49 trades, or 79.218 points per trade.

Here is how Belichick’s drafts rank in terms of net value points gained through trades:

1. 2007: +1,031 points
2. 2009: +632.2 points
3. 2011: +610.8 points
4. 2010: +588.6 points
5. 2003: +547.4 points
6. 2005: +283.9 points
7. 2008: +187.8 points
8. 2002: +89.5 points
9. 2000: +15.6 points
10. 2013: +9.5 points
11. 2004: 0 points (no draft day, pick-for-pick trades)
12. 2001: -0.5 points
13. 2006: -55 points
14. 2012: -59.1 points

2007 was far and away the most profitable, but that is skewed due to one trade. Belichick gained an incredible 914 value points from one trade. Belichick traded the 28^th overall pick to San Francisco for their fourth rounder that year (#110) and a first rounder next year that turned out to be the 7^th pick in the draft. That is the beauty of trading “out” and getting a future pick in return when your pick is at the bottom of its round. In a worst case scenario, the Patriots drop down four spots and gain a fourth rounder as insurance. That 49ers team was the 11^th worst in the league in 2007. Belichick was making a pretty safe bet that they would not end up in the NFC Conference Championship the next year. And it paid off, big time.

However, that huge gap in value is misleading. At that 28^th pick, the 49ers grabbed Joe Staley, who has been a rock on their offensive line. He has started 82 games since being drafted and was an AP 2^nd team All-NFL tackle the last two years in a row.

The Patriots, after taking Brandon Meriweather four spots earlier, turned their second first rounder into pick #110 and next year’s #7. Then it gets crazy. The Patriots traded that fourth round pick to the Oakland Raiders for Randy Moss, who, if you don’t recall, set a record with 23 receiving touchdowns on a team that came oh-so-close to a perfect season. Not bad for a fourth rounder. The Patriots also traded the 7^th pick (along with #164), moving down three spots to 10^th overall and bringing in #78 as well. #10 turned into Jerod Mayo, a stalwart in the Patriots’ front seven behind Vince Wilfork. With that third rounder, the Patriots took Shawn Crable. Remember him? He had half of a sack in 2010? No? He was on the team once, I swear.

Another thing to note along with that staggering figure in 2007; that draft was horrible. Just terrible. Brandon Meriweather was the best player the Patriots took that year. Brandon. Meriweather. Yeesh. After the troubled safety, sixth round offensive lineman Corey Hilliard played in the most games – 37. None of them in a Patriots uniform.

As for the last draft on that list, 2012 was nearly universally praised.  It is impossible to judge just a year later, but the class is off to a good start. Chandler Jones and Dont’a Hightower, the two front seven defenders that the Patriots traded up to take in the first round, are off to promising starts. Tavon Wilson, deemed a horrible reach by many, silenced a few critics with his play when he saw the field. Alfonzo Dennard was a great boon to a suspect pass defense. Jake Bequette and Nate Ebner still must prove themselves while Jeremy Ebert, the seventh round pick, was recently cut.

Where that 2012 draft really suffered in draft pick value points actually was not in either of the first round trades. It was when Belichick moved down, giving up a second rounder to the Packers for late third and fifth rounders and 116.4 value points. (The Packers got Casey Heyward. The Patriots, after an additional move, got Nate Ebner, Alfonzo Dennard and Jeremy Ebert.)

Perhaps Belichick was trying to make up for giving up those extra picks earlier and overcompensated in terms of value.

In the end, those value points mean little. They are useful in theory, but to even attempt to accurately evaluate the trade, you have to look at the players taken. Let’s look even deeper.

Notable Trades

2001 - 2^nd Round – Trade up

Patriots send: 2^nd rounder (#50), 6^th rounder (#173)

Patriots receive: 2^nd rounder (#48)
Trade partner: Detroit Lions

Net value: -2.2

The Patriots moved up just two spots here. Well, sitting pretty at #49 was none other than the New York Jets. Belichick got nervous, leapfrogged the rival to take the player he wanted at a mutual need and the Jets couldn’t do a thing about it.

And you better believe he would do it again because that player was a mainstay on the three Super Bowl winning teams and protected Tom Brady’s blindside for most of his career. Matt Light may have been 2.2 value points away from being a New York Jet.

The Jets did not take a tackle at #49, but they did in the next round. Would they have taken Matt Light? I have no idea. Would I want Belichick to risk it? Would Tom Brady? Hell no.

2003 – 1^st round – Trade up

Patriots send: 1^st rounder (#14), 6^th rounder (#193)

Patriots receive: 1^st rounder (#13)

Trade partner: Chicago Bears

Net value: +34.8

Similar to the 2001 trade with the Lions, this looks a small, almost unnecessary move. The Patriots gave up a sixth rounder to move up one spot. But the Patriots still ended up as a plus on this one and, with the Bears and Patriots both taking defensive lineman, got the player they wanted in Ty Warren. The Bears clearly felt that Warren and Michael Haynes, the defensive end they took with the 14^th pick, were interchangeable.

They were wrong. Haynes lasted three years in the league, registering 5.5 sacks total. Warren made a mean team with Richard Seymour on that New England defensive line, playing in the trenches in Foxborough until 2010.

Chicago traded the Patriots’ 6^th rounder along with their own to get a 5^th rounder, used to take Justin Gage, who started 16 games in four seasons with the Bears.

2003 – 1^st rounder – Future trade

Patriots send: 1^st rounder (#19)

Patriots receive: 2^nd rounder (#41), 2004 1^st rounder (#21)
Trade partner: Baltimore Ravens
Net value: +415

This is the only time Bill Belichick traded for a future pick that turned out to be lower than what he gave up. And he still gained 415 value points. Stop complaining about trading out for future picks.

Value points not good enough for ya? Fine, let’s talk about the players. With the 19^th pick, the Ravens selected their quarterback of the future – Kyle Boller. Some may pick nits and notice that other very good players were taken later that round (Willis McGahee, Dallas Clark, Nnamdi Asomugha) and the Pats could’ve had them. The Patriots used #41 to move up and take Eugene Wilson at #36, furthering the clamor for Asomugha, or even Charles Tillman, taken one spot earlier.

But the real prize of the trade was that 2004 1^st rounder. The Patriots and Belichick had to be licking their chops as Vince Wilfork slid further and further down that draft board and landed in their laps at #21. Steal.

2003 – 2^nd rounder – Trade up

Patriots send: 2^nd rounder (#50), 4^th rounder (#120)
Patriots receive: 2^nd rounder (#45)
Trade partner: Carolina Panthers
Net value: -4

2003 – 4^th rounder – Trade up

Patriots send: 4^th rounder (#128), 5^th rounder (#157)
Patriots receive: 4^th rounder (#120)
Trade partner: Denver Broncos
Net value: -19.6

I’m pairing these together because, although no one knew it at the time, the centerpiece of both trades was that fourth rounder that the Patriots gave away and then took back, #120. The Patriots gave it up to the Panthers so that they could draft Bethel Johnson in the 2^nd round. Carolina turned around and sent that fourth rounder and their own fourth and seventh round picks to the Broncos for the 82^nd pick.

So, after all was said and done, the Patriots got Johnson and Asante Samuel at #120. The Panthers drafted center Bruce Nelson and Ricky Manning. And the Broncos got Quentin Griffin, Clint Mitchell, Bryant McNeal and Ben Claxton.

P.S. Three picks for one third rounder, Carolina? Seriously?

2006 – 2^nd round – Trade up

Patriots send: 2^nd rounder (#52), 3^rd rounder (#75)
Patriots receive: 2^nd rounder (#36)
Trade partner: Green Bay Packers
Net value: -55

The infamous Chad Jackson trade. That net value isn’t negative enough. Belichick took a beating here.

Bill and his compatriots (see what I did there?) traded up 16 spots to take Chad Jackson, presumably because they didn’t want to subject anyone else to that walking hamstring injury. You’re welcome, league.

Compounding that bust is that Greg Jennings ended up as the 52^nd pick that year. The Packers used the third rounder on Jason Spitz, an interior lineman who started 41 games for Green Bay in his first three seasons before being relegated to perennial backup. So the Patriots essentially traded Greg Jennings and Jason Spitz for Chad Jackson. Ouch, Bill. Ouch.

2009 – 1^st round – Trade down

Patriots send: 1^st rounder (#26), 5^th rounder (#162)
Patriots receive: 2^nd rounder (#41), 3^rd rounder (#73), 3^rd rounder (#83)
Trade partner: Green Bay Packers
Net value: +162.4

Belichick takes a beating in the public eye for this one, too, because that 26^th pick was used for Clay Matthews, and the whole football world knows about the Patriots’ pass rush struggles. Just ask Eli Manning.

It is, really, kind of a disaster at first. The Packers get Matthews and with the 41^st pick the Patriots take Darius Butler and at #83 they get Brandon Tate, who did turn out to be a talented returner. But Tate was also taken one spot before Mike Wallace.

But, wait! That first 3^rd rounder! That’s where the magic happens. The Patriots flip it to the Jaguars for a 2010 second rounder (future pick alert!) and a 7^th rounder that turns into Julian Edelman, one of the few wide receivers taken by Belichick that has been worth the pick. The Patriots then package that 2010 second rounder (#44) with a sixth rounder to move up two spots to take Rob Gronkowski.

Dodged a bullet there, Bill.

2010 – 1^st round – Trade down

Patriots send: 1^st rounder (#22)
Patriots receive: 1^st rounder (#24), 4^th rounder (#113)
Trade partner: Denver Broncos
Net value: +100

2010 – 1^st round – Trade down

Patriots send: 1^st rounder (#24), 4^th rounder (#119)
Patriots receive: 1^st rounder (#27), 3^rd rounder (#90)
Trade partner: Dallas Cowboys
Net value: +24

Another pair of intertwined moves. These trades will fire some Patriots fans up because Belichick traded away not one pick that turned out to be an effective outside receiving threat, but two. First, the Broncos took Demaryius Thomas, who has started to come into his own with Peyton Manning throwing him the ball, and the Cowboys took Dez Bryant, the subject of much yearning from Patriots fans pre-draft. Then the Patriots use the Cowboys’ third rounder to take wide receiver Taylor Price, who is no longer on the team and that’s really all you need to know.

But with that 27^th pick, the Patriots took Devin McCourty. Now I could write 2,000 more words on McCourty, but I’ll just say this for now: he does not deserve the criticism he gets. Did he have a bit of a sophomore slump? Yes, but that rookie season was extremely impressive. Once he moved to safety, he became much more effective and has become a vital part of the defense. There is a reason he was named a team captain. Then at #113, Belichick made up for the Price miss and took tight end/wide receiver Aaron Hernandez.

Once again, Belichick appears to take a beating, but bounces back. Some may still argue that the Patriots lost this one, but I count it as a win – one that, in the end, wasn’t all that close.

So there is a quick history of Belichick’s draft day trades. I’d say he makes out pretty well. Trading down might look ugly, but he usually capitalizes on at least one of the extra choices. And that’s the point, isn’t it? The more picks you get, the more likely you are to get a quality player. When Belichick got burned the worst, he was trading up.

The lesson, as always, is that Chad Jackson sucks. Bill’s pretty smart, too.